The World Health Organisation said Friday that a mutation had been found in samples of the swine flu virus taken following the first two deaths from the pandemic in Norway. This is not unusual in itself because viruses, by their nature, will and do, mutate.
However, the WHO denied that the mutation had created a more contagious or more dangerous form of influenza A(H1N1) and they admitted that some similar cases observed elsewhere, had been mild. That was certainly the case for the people who did not die from it.
"The Norwegian Institute of Public Health has informed WHO of a mutation detected in three H1N1 viruses," the WHO said in a briefing note. Realistically, influenza viruses are continually undergoing mutations.
It is important to note that some of these are unsustainable and that some of these will succeed in not only being sustained but also in being drug resistant. It is their nature and follows the normal course of natural variation and selection, that all living things are prone to.
"The viruses were isolated from the first two fatal cases of pandemic influenza in the country (Norway) and one patient with severe illness," the report continued, although it added that no further instances were found in tests.
"Norwegian scientists have analysed samples from more than 70 patients with clinical illness and no further instances of this mutation have been detected (in the lab). This finding suggests that the mutation may not be widespread in the country," the UN health agency assumed, optimistically.
WHO spokesman Gregory Haertl said that the global health watchdog did not believe "that this has any significant impact, for the time being." Presumably, if the mutation proliferates over time, then it will become significant.
However, despite their blind faith and optimism, the agency admitted that a similar mutation had been observed in Brazil, China, Japan, Mexico, Ukraine, and the United States, as early as April 2009. Thus, contradicting themselves, whilst confirming the true nature of influenza viruses.
"The mutations appear to occur sporadically and spontaneously (you think!). To date, no links between the small number of patients infected with the mutated virus have been found and the mutation does not appear to spread," the WHO statement said. Some of those cases also produced mild symptoms, Haertl noted.
The WHO also underlined that there was no evidence of more infections or more deaths as a result, while the antiviral drugs used to treat severe flu, oseltamivir (Tamiflu) and zanamivir (Relenza), were still effective on the mutated virus.
Thus defending their single minded determination to follow this contraversial course of treatment, sponsored by the pharmaceutical agencies involved. Presumably to appear to be doing something in the face of an uncontrollable force of nature.
"Studies show that currently available pandemic vaccines confer(?) protection," it added, as mass vaccine campaigns were slowly gaining ground in the northern hemisphere amid signs of public skepticism in several European nations. (and growing profit margins of pharma companies)
Informed scientists naturally fear that mutations in flu viruses could cause more virulent and deadly pandemic flu. The global health watchdog reiterated a call for close monitoring.
The WHO was still assessing the significance of the latest observation, but it stressed that many such changes in the flu virus do not alter the illness it causes in patients.
"Although further investigation is under way, no evidence currently suggests that these mutations are leading to an unusual increase in the number of H1N1 infections or a greater number of severe or fatal cases," it added.
Norwegian authorities reported the country's first swine flu death on September 3, a 52 year-old Danish truck driver who died just over a week earlier.
On Friday, WHO data showed reported that around 6,750 people had died from swine flu since the virus was first uncovered in Mexico and the United States in April.
That represented an increase of about 500 more than a week ago, as the pandemic took hold in the northern hemisphere during the cold season
The WHO estimates that some 250,000 to 500,000 people die every year from standard seasonal variants of swine flu. Oh well! That's alright then. Sorry we troubled you guys. Let's just let you go back to sleep, whilst the rest of the world sits quietly by, watching people suffer and die.
Npw, the only question left in our minds is whether the WHO's approach to the pandemic is based on blatant incompetence or cynical corruption.
Showing posts with label influenza. Show all posts
Showing posts with label influenza. Show all posts
Monday, November 23, 2009
Saturday, July 18, 2009
Woman with swine flu dies 'after giving birth'
A woman in the UK who had contracted swine flu, died shortly after giving birth prematurely. The woman, who died in Whipps Cross Hospital, was named by her brother as Ruptara Miah.She is thought to be from Bangladesh.
Abdul Malik told BBC News his sister had used a wheelchair for 15 years after a road traffic accident but had led a normal life and had brought up six daughters. "We are very, very upset as a family. It has really taken me by shock," he said. "We thought she was going to recover."
His sister, the eldest of 10 children, was admitted to hospital three weeks ago with a cough and chest infection, he said. She was treated in intensive care, where she gave birth to a son prematurely, but never regained full consciousness, he added.
The baby is now in intensive care as a precaution
A spokesman for Whipps Cross said: "Whipps Cross University Hospital NHS Trust can confirm that a 39-year-old woman passed away on July 13 2009, and that she was infected with pandemic H1N1. The trust can confirm that she had underlying health conditions. No further comments can be made at this time."
Tuesday, May 5, 2009
Executive Pandemic Preparation
With the H1N1 swine influenza spreading across the world, it's a good time to discuss and update your pandemic plan. If you do have a plan. If you don't have one, you are putting your organisation at great risk.
There are measures that can help organisations and that will guarantee the continuity of their operations but for organisations with outdated or without pandemic preparedness plans, the first step is for the executive management team to establish 'the policy'; guiding principles for the coming weeks and months which address duty of care responsibility and then to communicate this policy and those decisions, to the workforce.
There are also policies and protocols that can have a strong impact in countering a pandemic emergency.
Organisations should ask themselves the following ten questions:
1. Have you defined reliable information sources that you will monitor for situational awareness in the event of an influenza pandemic?
It is essential to ensure that the information sources you choose are reliable, appreciate nuances and bring a degree of expertise and analysis to these types of events. The information gathered from these sources will be critical for your decision-making process and you want to make good decisions based on the best possible knowledge available.
2. Has top management documented a "policy"? A set of guiding principles that outlines:
3. Does the firm have in place a robust Crisis Management & Communications program that will allow executives to make key decisions on a timely basis and communicate messages to both internal and external stakeholders?
Influenza pandemic is a prolonged event and will require management not only to assess and make decisions in response to changing conditions, but to also accurately and effectively communicate these decisions to all necessary parties. Pandemic crisis management requires a completely different perspective, analysis and action-plan than natural disaster crisis planning. The question in pandemic planning, is not how do we pick up the pieces; rather it is how do we live with this emerging situation over the course of the next 18 months?
4. Is there a Business Continuity program in place that documents key products and services that will receive prioritised attention during a time of reduced staff availability?
If only 50 percent of staff is in the workplace on a particular day, which business activities will be conducted and which will be deferred?
Traditional business continuity is based on putting people back to work after sustaining a loss to a building, equipment or other operational systems. Pandemic business continuity planning completely turns this concept on its ear; the building is intact, the systems are functioning but there is a shortage of people. In this scenario, you will have to establish priorities for your reduced workforce and you will have to consider what functions are not absolutely essential to your organization at that moment and defer these functions.
5. Has the firm implemented a robust employee health program that will guide safe workplace protocols, such as facility access, social distancing, and surface cleaning?
In the event of an influenza pandemic, the goal is preventing the virus from spreading. This prevention is applicable for public systems, such as trains and buses, to households and to businesses. Surface cleaning and social distancing both prove effective and can have a major impact. The conventional perspective is that people are universally susceptible to influenza pandemics and we must rely on these approaches to limit contagion.
6. Has the firm documented HR provisions that outline actions employees should take if they become ill and how to handle sick leave and family care issues?
Just as with any other company initiative, people need to know what to do. It sounds so simple, but if you don't provide clear instruction regarding sick leave, employees will show up to work sick and ask whether they should stay or go. You need to remove any uncertainty in the mind of the employee so that they can stay home and get better without risk of spreading the virus to other employees.
7. Are key strategies for remote connectivity of workers backed up by actual IT capabilities in terms of VPN bandwidth and hardware availability?
The 'go-to' solution for many companies during a pandemic is simply to have employees work from home. However, more often than not, there are real IT limitations to this strategy. You need to be realistic and ask whether your existing IT infrastructure can support your entire workforce working from home at once. I can tell you now that the answer will be a resounding 'No'. Business plans need to take into account how the IT systems work.
8. Has the firm prepared guidance for expatriate employees and mobile workers? Does the firm have the ability to re-create travel patterns for employees, to support investigation into risk exposure?
This goes back to ensuring that your sources of information are reliable and establishing your guiding principles. In normal circumstances, the need for travel policies is clear, but you have to determine whether you will restrict all non-essential travel for employees. When considering expatriate employees, you must decide what care you will offer them and at what point will remove them from their current location.
9. Has the firm discussed its pandemic preparedness efforts with key vendors, suppliers and other business partners?
Even the strongest in-house pandemic preparedness program can be rendered worthless if the company has a dependence on a third-party that is compromised. This is true not only for manufacturers, but also for professional services providers. Companies with an outsourced IT call centres or outsourced legal support, etc., could be left without critical business functions if their outsourced operations are compromised.
10. What is the firms position on the procurement and stockpiling of both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical protective measures? If there is a formal program, who is responsible and are all key provisions up to date?
Stock piled Anti-viral treatments are receiving so much attention right now that it is almost tempting to mistake them for a pandemic preparedness program. They are not. You are advised to look closely at your guiding principles, to determine whether these treatments fit your needs and whether you will procure either or both protective measures. The decisions on both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical protective measures will vary from firm to firm and will vary with circumstances.
Remember, a Business Continuity Plan (BCP) normally prepares an organisation for disasters that have a sudden onset but a limited scope, duration and geographic location. A pandemic outbreak by nature is unpredictable, so the plan must be much more flexible.
We know that pandemics are not limited by geographic location. Most pandemics come in waves that can last from four to six months and that absenteeism is the single most serious threat to businesses.
Most official guidelines recommend the following as a starting point:
There are measures that can help organisations and that will guarantee the continuity of their operations but for organisations with outdated or without pandemic preparedness plans, the first step is for the executive management team to establish 'the policy'; guiding principles for the coming weeks and months which address duty of care responsibility and then to communicate this policy and those decisions, to the workforce.
There are also policies and protocols that can have a strong impact in countering a pandemic emergency.
Organisations should ask themselves the following ten questions:
1. Have you defined reliable information sources that you will monitor for situational awareness in the event of an influenza pandemic?
It is essential to ensure that the information sources you choose are reliable, appreciate nuances and bring a degree of expertise and analysis to these types of events. The information gathered from these sources will be critical for your decision-making process and you want to make good decisions based on the best possible knowledge available.
2. Has top management documented a "policy"? A set of guiding principles that outlines:
- The commitments the firm will make to protect employees and ensure duty of care
- The types of programs the firm will keep in place
- The budget available for planning
- The executive person responsible for implementing these programs
3. Does the firm have in place a robust Crisis Management & Communications program that will allow executives to make key decisions on a timely basis and communicate messages to both internal and external stakeholders?
Influenza pandemic is a prolonged event and will require management not only to assess and make decisions in response to changing conditions, but to also accurately and effectively communicate these decisions to all necessary parties. Pandemic crisis management requires a completely different perspective, analysis and action-plan than natural disaster crisis planning. The question in pandemic planning, is not how do we pick up the pieces; rather it is how do we live with this emerging situation over the course of the next 18 months?
4. Is there a Business Continuity program in place that documents key products and services that will receive prioritised attention during a time of reduced staff availability?
If only 50 percent of staff is in the workplace on a particular day, which business activities will be conducted and which will be deferred?
Traditional business continuity is based on putting people back to work after sustaining a loss to a building, equipment or other operational systems. Pandemic business continuity planning completely turns this concept on its ear; the building is intact, the systems are functioning but there is a shortage of people. In this scenario, you will have to establish priorities for your reduced workforce and you will have to consider what functions are not absolutely essential to your organization at that moment and defer these functions.
5. Has the firm implemented a robust employee health program that will guide safe workplace protocols, such as facility access, social distancing, and surface cleaning?
In the event of an influenza pandemic, the goal is preventing the virus from spreading. This prevention is applicable for public systems, such as trains and buses, to households and to businesses. Surface cleaning and social distancing both prove effective and can have a major impact. The conventional perspective is that people are universally susceptible to influenza pandemics and we must rely on these approaches to limit contagion.
6. Has the firm documented HR provisions that outline actions employees should take if they become ill and how to handle sick leave and family care issues?
Just as with any other company initiative, people need to know what to do. It sounds so simple, but if you don't provide clear instruction regarding sick leave, employees will show up to work sick and ask whether they should stay or go. You need to remove any uncertainty in the mind of the employee so that they can stay home and get better without risk of spreading the virus to other employees.
7. Are key strategies for remote connectivity of workers backed up by actual IT capabilities in terms of VPN bandwidth and hardware availability?
The 'go-to' solution for many companies during a pandemic is simply to have employees work from home. However, more often than not, there are real IT limitations to this strategy. You need to be realistic and ask whether your existing IT infrastructure can support your entire workforce working from home at once. I can tell you now that the answer will be a resounding 'No'. Business plans need to take into account how the IT systems work.
8. Has the firm prepared guidance for expatriate employees and mobile workers? Does the firm have the ability to re-create travel patterns for employees, to support investigation into risk exposure?
This goes back to ensuring that your sources of information are reliable and establishing your guiding principles. In normal circumstances, the need for travel policies is clear, but you have to determine whether you will restrict all non-essential travel for employees. When considering expatriate employees, you must decide what care you will offer them and at what point will remove them from their current location.
9. Has the firm discussed its pandemic preparedness efforts with key vendors, suppliers and other business partners?
Even the strongest in-house pandemic preparedness program can be rendered worthless if the company has a dependence on a third-party that is compromised. This is true not only for manufacturers, but also for professional services providers. Companies with an outsourced IT call centres or outsourced legal support, etc., could be left without critical business functions if their outsourced operations are compromised.
10. What is the firms position on the procurement and stockpiling of both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical protective measures? If there is a formal program, who is responsible and are all key provisions up to date?
Stock piled Anti-viral treatments are receiving so much attention right now that it is almost tempting to mistake them for a pandemic preparedness program. They are not. You are advised to look closely at your guiding principles, to determine whether these treatments fit your needs and whether you will procure either or both protective measures. The decisions on both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical protective measures will vary from firm to firm and will vary with circumstances.
Remember, a Business Continuity Plan (BCP) normally prepares an organisation for disasters that have a sudden onset but a limited scope, duration and geographic location. A pandemic outbreak by nature is unpredictable, so the plan must be much more flexible.
We know that pandemics are not limited by geographic location. Most pandemics come in waves that can last from four to six months and that absenteeism is the single most serious threat to businesses.
Most official guidelines recommend the following as a starting point:
- Develop communication strategies as well as preventative and mitigating measures. These should include sourcing supplies to protect employees, pandemic monitoring, and employee education.
- Have a documented strategy that deals with a pandemic outbreak in emerging stages (detection, regional outbreak, local outbreak, etc.)
- Have a documented policy and strategy that includes the facilities, procedures, people and systems that are needed to keep your business up and running.
- Don't just have a plan, test it and update it.
- Monitor and review the plan regularly to keep it up to date.
- Secure the services of a Pandemic BC expert and take head of good advice.
Monday, May 4, 2009
H1N1: Egypt pig slaughter prompts religious discourse
These drastic and extreme measures have been taken by the north African country, although it has yet to report any H1N1 cases. This over-reaction could be due to the fact that Egypt was hit hard by bird flu in 2005/6 or there could be different, more fundamental reasons.
In Cairo, police fired tear gas at farmers and protesters who pelted them with rocks and bottles over fears they had come to seize their pigs. At least ten people were injured in the clashes in Manshiet Nasr, a shantytown on the outskirts of the capital city. Residents burned tyres and rubbish in the street to keep police at bay. Three officers were also injured in clashes with pig farmers in other areas of the capital.
The sad truth is that the H1N1 virus is being spread by people, not pigs. Destroying innocent and valuable livestock and the devastating effect this will have on the owners and their families, is beyond measure. In this poverty stricken area, these people are fighting for their lives.
Some political commentators say that culling swine, which are mainly raised by the Christian minority and viewed as unclean by Muslims, could have different and more sinister undertones, rather than simply being an extremely puzzling and foolish measure to quell rising public panic.
If this is the case, then a more severe backlash will develop over the coming days and weeks. Loosely targeted at the pigs, their owners and their livelihood, it may well plunge Egypt into increased levels of civil disobedience, fueled by bigotry, extremism and political unrest.
Some political commentators say that culling swine, which are mainly raised by the Christian minority and viewed as unclean by Muslims, could have different and more sinister undertones, rather than simply being an extremely puzzling and foolish measure to quell rising public panic.
If this is the case, then a more severe backlash will develop over the coming days and weeks. Loosely targeted at the pigs, their owners and their livelihood, it may well plunge Egypt into increased levels of civil disobedience, fueled by bigotry, extremism and political unrest.
Tuesday, April 28, 2009
H1N1: The story behind the pandemic
The H1N1 influenza viruses consisting of a mixture of human, swine and bird strains (H5N1) are not new, they have been found before throughout history of mankind. However, there is a sense in which this virus could be regarded as partly man-made.Flu viruses contain 8 strands of RNA, which code for 10 proteins. If two flu viruses infect a cell at the same time, new viruses budding from that cell can contain a mixture of RNA strands from the two original viruses, this is a phenomenon called re-assortment. This Recombination, "cutting and pasting", can also produce some evolutionary mixing within RNA strands.
Vaccines such as Tamiflu (Oseltamivir) and Relenza (Zanamivir), are not totally effective against viral strains
It is unusual to be infected by two flu viruses at the same time, and even rarer for one of those viruses to come from another species altogether, but it does happen, especially in pigs, which are susceptible to both human and bird flu viruses. Repeated re-assortments can produce mixtures like that found in the swine flu virus now spreading worldwide.
Again it is not a new phenomenon. There was re-assortment between bird and human flu viruses in pigs in Italy during the 1980s and in the 1990s, a H1N2 swine flu circulating in pigs in the UK was found to be a mixture of swine, human and bird flu strains resulting from multiple re-assortments.
It is not yet clear exactly when and how Mexican swine flu strain evolved, but it could certainly have happened without the help of genetic engineers. Despite this, the swine flu could still be regarded as man-made.
Mounted Policeman in Mexico City sports a facemaskThere are now over 6 billion people on the planet, and each year we raise more than a billion pigs and perhaps as many as 70 billion chickens. The result is a paradise for influenza viruses, which can lie dormant for long periods.
The problem is not just the sheer number of potential hosts. The conditions in which animals are kept can favour the evolution of new and deadlier strains.
Par example, in the wild, flu viruses can be self-limiting. The nasty flu strains that make animals too ill to walk or fly are unlikely to spread far. In crowded factory farms, they can spread like wildfire, helped by the global trade in animals and the distribution and transportation of animal products.
Vaccines such as Tamiflu (Oseltamivir) and Relenza (Zanamivir), are not totally effective against viral strains
The intimate interaction of farm workers with animals, especially on small-holdings where pigs, ducks, chickens and children all happily intermingle, also provides plenty of opportunities for viruses to jump species.
Animal vaccines might seem like the answer, but vaccines e.g Tamiflu (Oseltamivir) and Relenza (Zanamivir) that do not provide 100% protection can actually make things worse. Vaccines are not totally effective against viral strains. When there is widespread vaccination, viruses can mutate and spread without any visible disease. Viruses are smart. Ineffective vaccines also create strong selective pressure driving the evolution of new strains that can dodge the immune attack provoked by the vaccine.
Already, attention is turning to the big pig farms in Mexico, and the role they may have played in creating this new strain of swine flu but all intensive pig farming is a 'risk' and 'at risk'.
The undeniable and scary fact is, that we still know so little about flu and what makes it capable of spreading from human to human. This means that analysing and reverse engineering a virus of this kind and developing an anti-virus, would be a huge challenge.
Yes, it's possible that this virus was created by a mistake at a research laboratory or a vaccine factory and it is more possible that a virulent strain has been accidentally released into the wild, as has happened many times before and the most plausible explanation is, that this monster is the long-predicted product of our farming system.
H1N1 Pandemic - WHO raises pandemic threat level
World health officials have raised the level of alert about a possible swine flu pandemic, since the virus seems to be spreading regularly from person to person.The World Health Organization (WHO) upgraded the alert in an http://kenbudd.blogspot.com/2009/04/h1n1-story-behind-pandemic.html in Geneva on Monday evening.
"It's a significant step towards pandemic influenza, but it is a phase that says we are not there yet," said Keiji Fukada of the WHO. "A pandemic is not considered inevitable at this time."
The new H1N1 influenza virus has struck hundreds of people in Mexico, where at least 18 have died, and several dozen people in the US (see Deadly new flu virus in US and Mexico may go pandemic). In the last couple of days, confirmed cases have also been found in Canada, Spain and Scotland.
Six-point scale
WHO officials decided that the new cases and infection patterns warranted increasing their pandemic warning level from 3 to 4, on a six-point scale.
Ever since the scale went into use in 2005, it has stayed at 3 – indicating that most cases of an emergent influenza virus are caused by animal-to-human transmission.
At 4, the infection is spread primarily from human to human. At 5, human-to-human transmission is occurring at multiple geographic locations; while 6 represents an all-out pandemic, which occurs when a virus is new, causes severe disease, and transmits easily enough to be sustained.
Researchers are still studying how efficiently the virus spreads. "The situation is very fluid and it is possible we could move to a higher phase shortly," Fukada said.
H1N1 Pandemic - WHO raises pandemic threat level
World health officials have raised the level of alert about a possible swine flu pandemic, since the virus seems to be spreading regularly from person to person. The World Health Organization (WHO) upgraded the alert in an emergency meeting in Geneva on Monday evening.
"It's a significant step towards http://kenbudd.blogspot.com/2009/03/h5n1-bird-flu-virus-risky-move.html, but it is a phase that says we are not there yet," said Keiji Fukada of the WHO. "A pandemic is not considered inevitable at this time."
The new H1N1 influenza virus has struck hundreds of people in Mexico, where at least 18 have died, and several dozen people in the US (see Deadly new flu virus in US and Mexico may go pandemic). In the last couple of days, confirmed cases have also been found in Canada, Spain and Scotland.
Six-point scale
WHO officials decided that the new cases and infection patterns warranted increasing their pandemic warning level from 3 to 4, on a six-point scale.
Ever since the scale went into use in 2005, it has stayed at 3 – indicating that most cases of an emergent influenza virus are caused by animal-to-human transmission.
At 4, the infection is spread primarily from human to human. At 5, human-to-human transmission is occurring at multiple geographic locations; while 6 represents an all-out pandemic, which occurs when a virus is new, causes severe disease, and transmits easily enough to be sustained.
Researchers are still studying how efficiently the virus spreads. "The situation is very fluid and it is possible we could move to a higher phase shortly," Fukada said.
Thursday, March 5, 2009
H5N1 (Bird Flu) virus - Risky move
IT'S emerged that virulent H5N1 bird flu was sent out by accident from an Austrian lab last year and given to ferrets in the Czech Republic before anyone realised. As well as the risk of it escaping into the wild, the H5N1 got mixed with a human strain, which might have spawned a hybrid that could unleash a pandemic. Last December, the Austrian branch of US vaccine company Baxter sent a batch of ordinary human H3N2 flu, altered so it couldn't replicate, to Avir Green Hills Biotechnology, also in Austria. In February, a lab in the Czech Republic working for Avir alerted Baxter that, unexpectedly, ferrets inoculated with the sample had died. It turned out the sample contained live H5N1, which Baxter uses to make vaccine. The two batches seem to have been mixed in error.
Markus Reinhard of Baxter says no one was infected because the H3N2 was handled at a high level of containment. But Ab Osterhaus of Erasmus University in the Netherlands says: "We need to go to great lengths to make sure this kind of thing doesn't happen."
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